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I. Introduction 
 
 The S&P 500 consists of 500 stocks chosen for market size, liquidity, and 
industry group representation. It is both one of the most widely used benchmarks of US 
equity performance, and also widely tracked by investors who wish to remain diversified. 
Prior to 1989, if a component of the index needed to be replaced for any reason S&P 
would announce and implement the change after trading had closed on a single day. In 
October 1989 S&P changed this policy to allow approximately one week of trading 
between the announcement date and the change date. This new knowledge of high 
demand for the added stock on a certain day gives us a chance to test the efficient market 
theory. This article examines price and volume history for firms added to or deleted from 
the S&P 500 from January 1990 through December 2000. 
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this study is the evidence of an 
increase in market efficiency over time. We have found that as our proxy for investor 
interest has increased significantly over time, the trading profit available to investors has 
fallen. We believe that this is the first study that has shown such a relationship, although 
future work should concentrate on evaluating the actual relationship between possible 
abnormal returns, investor interest in this trade, and indexing based on the S&P 500. 
 For additions we found a positive average abnormal return of 4.34% from the 
close on the announcement day to the close of trading the next day. We found an 
additional 5.45% increase from the close of trading on the day after announcement to the 
closing price on the day of addition. Using a previously studied trading strategy (Lynch 
and Mendenhall 1997 and Beneish and Whaley 1996) of selling short (buying) $1 of the 
index and going long (short) $1 of the stock for additions (deletions) this 5.45% increase 
could have been turned into trading profits which significantly outweighed any trading 
costs. After the addition of the stock to the index, we found that price release over the 
seven-day release period determined by Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) results in a total 
3.12% increase from the open after announcement through the price release. Although 
this is similar to the amount found by other researchers, we were not able to verify the 
3.12% as significant.  
We found similar results for those stocks that were deleted from the index, but 
with returns, as would be expected, in the opposite direction. Overnight returns from the 
announcement day close to the next morning’s open (3.26%) were only about half of the 
6.51% decrease from the initial day close-close change. From the open after 
announcement, we found a 10.15% decrease which could have been captured by traders 
using our strategy of shorting on the open and covering at the close. Interestingly, for 
deletions we also find that there is almost no price release, and find a significant 
permanent price decrease of 10.13% which may be related to lower overall demand for 
the removed stock. 
 The semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis states that the all publicly 
available information is reflected in securities prices. Under this theory, the market’s 
historical knowledge of high abnormal returns for index additions and deletions would 
drive a security’s price up to its expected addition-day value on the day after 
announcement. Although most index funds do not buy until the addition day, rational 
investors would not sell for less than the expected addition-day price. The fact that there 
is the 5.45% increase from the end of the day after announcement to the close is a 
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violation of this hypothesis. However, we do find that over time this effect has decreased, 
indicating that the market is becoming more efficient. 
 The existence of a price reversal in the days following the addition also points to a 
violation of the efficient market. High volumes on the day of addition point to heavy 
index trading as funds like the Vanguard 500 add the stock to their portfolio. This makes 
sense because many index fund managers’ incentives are based on minimizing tracking 
error. If fund managers added a stock before the official addition to take advantage of 
historical price increases they would not be rewarded, and face significant penalties if the 
stock were to decline from their purchase and the closing price on the addition day. We 
can see in Figure 5 that over time the volume of trading on the close day has risen at a 
faster pace than days between announcement and close (a slope of 0.0017 on the AD vs. 
0.0001 for the days between AD+1 and CD), indicating a continued preference for 
addition-day purchases on the part of large fund managers.  
Instead of attempting to determine the release date, we used seven days for 
additions and five days for deletions. These time period were determined by Lynch and 
Mendenhall (1997) in their study of the same price effects. We confirmed these price 
release figures, except that for deletions the price release in the early days following the 
close are followed by renewed selling and price decline through the end of our sample at 
CD+10. 
 Although the continued evidence of significant abnormal trading returns available 
to investors indicates an inefficient market, we see evidence of the slow erosion of those 
profits. First, the prevalence of indexing has taken off over our time period. One proxy 
that we look at (IFM) is the fraction of the net asset value (NAV) of the S&P 500 
companies that is owned by the Vanguard 500 index fund. This fraction increased over 
10 times from January 1990 to December 1998, and the Vanguard 500 fund owned nearly 
1% of the NAV of S&P 500 companies by 2001. We also found a proxy (CD-MAV) for 
indexing in the abnormal volume of trading on the addition day (CD) as a fraction of the 
stock’s historical trading volumes. This rise in indexing would be expected to increase 
the demand for shares on the addition day, and thereby the profits available to those who 
bought on the open after announcement (AD+1) and sold at the close on CD (this return 
will be referred to as OC-MAR going forward). Admittedly, there are problems with both 
of these as proxies for indexing, including discrepancies between Vanguard’s growth and 
the amount of money actually indexed, and the dispersal of block trading over the period 
before and after CD. We also found them to be positively, if not significantly, correlated 
(Figure 7). 
Mitigating this indexing effect, however, is the increase in investors’ awareness of 
our trading strategy. Although it would be very difficult to determine the number of 
investors or the amount of money following this risk arbitrage strategy, we developed 
two proxies for the increase. First, we look at the abnormal volume on the day after 
announcement (AD+1 MAV) under the assumption that enterprising traders would be 
buying at the open to capture as much profit as possible. Second we look at the actual 
returns earned by a trader who followed this strategy, under the assumption that the more 
arbitrageurs following the strategy, the higher the opening price would be. With a limited 
amount of demand from index funds on the close day and therefore a limited CD closing 
price, the higher the AD+1 open price the lower OC-MAR would be.  
4 
Although interesting, these proxies did not completely explain the relationship 
between indexing and abnormal returns, and we find that in most samples as IFM and 
CD-MAV increase the returns available to traders actually decrease (Figures 9-20). We 
expect that this is a result of the investor interest proxies over powering the increase in 
indexing. When we attempt to regress OC-MAR using both variables, the correlation 
between the two and high variance in the data make it difficult to separate out the 
relationships. 
 There are also implications in this paper for the existence of a downward-sloping 
demand curve for securities (Harris and Gurel 1986, Shleifer 1986). As index fund 
managers buy up securities around the change period, the supply of stock available for 
trading in the non-indexed marketplace is reduced, theoretically causing the market-
clearing price to increase. The reverse should be true for deletions, where an increase in 
supply from index fund selling would decrease the market-clearing price. If the demand 
curve for securities were horizontal, any increase or decrease in demand would not affect 
the permanent price of the stock. We find that there is still a positive but not significant 
price increase for additions, and a significantly negative permanent price decrease for 
deletions from the announcement through the end of the price release period determined 
by Lynch and Mendenhall. Although inconclusive, this may indicate a downward sloping 
demand curve for securities. 
 This is not the only explanation for the increase (decrease) that we see when a 
stock is added (deleted) to the S&P 500. Other explanations include temporary price 
pressure resulting from heavy index fund buying and selling (the temporary price 
pressure hypothesis), a liquidity change resulting from inclusion in a widely followed 
index (the liquidity hypothesis Amihud and Mendelson 1986, 1993), or any non-public 
information that is implied in S&P’s announcement of the change (the information 
hypothesis Jain 1987). If inclusion in the index were to affect the stock’s liquidity, then 
the stock price should rise by the amount of any resulting decrease in trading costs. The 
information hypothesis is based on the possibility that S&P uses significant non-public 
information in the decision about which stock to add to the index. By adding a stock to 
it’s index S&P is giving implicit approval and in some cases legitimacy to a stock or 
industry. Finally, the price pressure hypothesis argues that the buying by index funds 
drives up the price only temporarily, and that after index funds are done buying their 
initial allotment this pressure would fade and prices return to their equilibrium level. 
 The results that we present here are able to partly clarify this mass of alternatives. 
The significant announcement day change is consistent with all four hypotheses 
(temporary price pressure, downward sloping demand, liquidity, and additional 
information). We would assume that in an efficient market any additional information or 
change in liquidity would be priced into the overnight change after the announcement, 
and we do in fact see a significant abnormal return over that time. Increased demand from 
traders resulting in temporary price pressure can explain the abnormal returns available to 
traders between the open on the day after the announcement and the close for deletions. 
However, only the downward-sloping demand curve hypothesis can explain a permanent 
price increase or decrease from the open after announcement (when information and 
liquidity has been priced) and the end of the release period (when all temporary price 
pressure has been relieved). Once the stock has been added and most of the index selling 
is complete (as measured by the ending of the Lynch and Mendenhall five day release 
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period for deletions) there still remains a statistically significant price decrease for our 
deletion sample from the open after announcement to the end of the release period. This 
decrease can only be explained by a downward sloping demand curve for securities. 
 Although we will not spend a lot of time on theory in this paper, we will go more 
into the empirical evidence to support various hypotheses in section III, along with the 
presentation of our results. Readers wanting a further discussion of these hypotheses 
should see Lynch and Mendenhall (1997). The next section will detail the sample of data 
and the research method used in this study. Finally, Section IV will present a conclusion 
and ideas for future research. 
 
II. Data and Methodology 
 
 In the interests of consistency, all data for results, graphs, and tables in this paper 
are from 1989 to 1999 inclusive unless otherwise stated. Although we had most of the 
data for 2000 it was not complete so we declined to use it. 
 Data for this study was collected from a number of sources. Standard & Poor’s 
Corporation supplied information on index additions and deletions between 1989 and 
2000, including announcement and addition dates. Daily stock volumes and closing 
prices, as well as index volumes and closing prices were obtained from the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) for the period from 1989 through 1999. Volume 
and closing price data, as well as opening prices for all securities were obtained from 
Bloomberg. The market portfolio for daily returns is considered to be the stocks of the 
S&P 500, and market share volumes are the sum of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ daily 
volumes.  
 From the total sample of 304 additions and 304 deletions, a number of securities 
had to be removed. First removed were any securities for which data of one form or 
another could not be found. Five additions and 11 deletions were removed from the 
sample for this reason. Secondly, there are a number of index changes for which no 
trading is required by index funds, including name changes and/or replacements due to 
part of a company spinning off and the child and/or parent remaining in the index. 35 
additions and 39 deletions were removed. Third, any company which was mentioned in 
connection with merger and acquisition activity for three months prior to the 
announcement of the change. Sources for this information were the Dow Jones News 
Service, Bloomberg, and the Wall Street Journal Archives. These 85 additions and 194 
deletions were removed because index funds often will not need to trade, and they would 
deaden the results of our sample. Fourth, S&P’s policy is that firms are removed from the 
index immediately after filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection or when a 
recapitalization plan is approved by shareholders that substantially changes the firm’s 
debt/equity ratio. In these 8 cases, the deleted firm was removed from the sample both 
because the bankruptcy introduces information issues that may add noise to our results, 
and because the one-day period between announcement and change is too short. Finally, 
we removed 67 additions because there were not a sufficient number of trading days 
between the announcement and change. We require that there be at least one full day of 
trading between the announcement of the change and the day of the change. Firms that 
are added in one day for whatever reason are much more like the pre-1989 policy of S&P 
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and would not yield profits from our trading strategy. The final sample was made up of 
112 additions and 52 deletions. 
 
Methodology: 
 We used an event study methodology (further described in Lynch and Mendenhall 
1997) to study additions and deletions from the S&P 500. The two event days were the 
day of the announcement (AD), and the actual change day (CD). Because the 
announcement comes after the market close, the first day of trading on the news is AD+1. 
Similarly, because a stock is officially added to the index as of the close of trading on the 
change day, CD+1 is the first day of trading after the second event. 
 Abnormal Return Calculation.  Because we wanted to adjust for daily variations 
in the market relative to individual stock prices, daily abnormal return (AR) of the stock 
is defined as its raw return minus the raw return of the market. The mean abnormal return 
(MAR) for each event day in our study is considered to be the average AR of every firm 
that is represented on that day. However, because of the variation in the length of time 
between AD and CD, not every stock will be represented on every given day. For 
example, if stock A has three days between AD and CD and stock B has ten days, stock 
A will not be represented in the AD+5 row of Table 1 or 2, and the ‘N’ column will 
reflect the decreased participation.  
 Abnormal Volume Calculation. In order to calculate volume increases resulting 
from the announcement of a firm’s addition to or deletion from the S&P 500, we must 
first calculate a base period. The period used was the 10 trading days prior to the 
announcement, including the day of the announcement itself, and we establish this base 
for both the market and the individual security. After the announcement, abnormal 
volume in the stock was considered to be the firm’s percentage volume above the base 
minus the same fraction for the market overall. For additions (Figure 2) we typically 
observed a 350% increase on the day immediately after the announcement, and a nearly 
1400% increase on the day of the change. The daily averages can be observed in Figure 2 
and Tables 3 and 4. 
 Price release period determination. Rather than attempt to determine a price 
release period from our own data, we decided to use those determined from an earlier 
study on the same subject matter by Lynch and Mendenhall (1997). They found there to 
be significant price release for seven trading days following an addition and 5 days 
following deletions. This is consistent with our results (Figure 1, Tables 1 and 2) over 
time, except that we noticed a return to significantly negative returns after the five day 
price release window for deletions. 
 Grouping of results for regressions. Pooling all returns by years and trying to 
regress them would have provided nicely accurate averages, but left us with few data 
points and would have missed intra-year changes. Instead, we pooled return data by 
month according to the closing day of the change. Thus, if there were two changes made 
in March 1990, then the abnormal volume and return numbers used for regressions would 
be the average of the two. We ignored months for which there were no changes. This 
method yielded us 71 data points for additions and 33 for deletions. 
 Significance Tests. Significance tests on MAV and MAR (tc(MAR and 
tc(MAV))for the event studies were performed using a cross-sectional variance estimator 
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(Asquith 1983), known to perform well in testing, given the increase in variance of AR 
around the event dates. Details can be found in Lynch and Mendenhall (1997).  
 
III. Results 
 
Price Results.  
Tables 1 and 2 present numerical data for addition and deletion returns over the 
range of our study, and are graphically displayed in Figure 1. For each of the 6 event days 
displayed after AD and before CD in Tables 1 and 2, those companies whose AD and CD 
are less than seven days apart are steadily removed from the sample. Thus, the number of 
firms in each sample declines over the event window. In both tables, the AD and CD are 
shown as zero in the time series. In addition, AD+1 is broken up into the overnight 
increase between the closing price before the addition and the opening price after 
addition (CO-MAR) which is not available to traders, and the intra-day return from the 
open to the close which is available to traders (OC-MAR). The summary of the two, or 
CC-MAR is also included.  
 For both additions and deletions, the AD+1 abnormal return is significantly 
different from zero. We find a close-close average return of 4.34% for additions although, 
interestingly, all positive return is overnight and any trader that bought on the open would 
have actually lost a small percentage during the day. On average, however, they would 
have made up the loss as the price rose significantly by close of trading on the change 
day.  
For additions (deletions) we can see in Figure 3(Figure 4) how the returns have 
changed over time. As we would have expected, the total percentage change from the AD 
close to the CD close has risen slightly over time, possibly because of the large increases 
in indexing, but also explainable by growing liquidity or information effects. However, 
just as the total change has been increasing, the profit available to traders has fallen 
slightly because more of this increase is coming between the announcement close and the 
open the next morning, a period which is not available to traders. This could be explained 
by the increasing investor attention on the trading possibilities, and we have used CO-
MAR as one of our proxies for investor’s attention to the risk arbitrage opportunity 
available. 
Figure 1 displays the average price increase from nine days before the 
announcement day (AD-9) to 10 days after the close (CD+10). Both of these graphs look 
very similar to the results found by Lynch and Mendenhall in 1997. We do want to point 
out that because of the variation in trading days between AD and CD, we had to take 
some liberties with the presentation of the graph. Since every change in our sample has at 
least one distinct day after announcement and a separate close day, the percentage change 
for those days are true. However, for presentation’s sake we took the average number of 
days between A+1 and CD (4 days for additions and 3 for deletions) and averaged the 
remaining return over those days. So for additions, the return for each of the four days 
will be the total AD to CD return minus the actual AD+1 and CD returns divided by four. 
You can view the actual average daily returns in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Volume Results 
 Tables 3 and 4 present mean abnormal volume (MAV) results over time, while 
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation. Although the actual windows vary, we only 
display a maximum six-day window between the announcement and change. Again, you 
can see in the ‘N’ column the number of firms that are represented in each day. As 
expected, we notice the highest levels of abnormal volume on AD+1 and CD, the CD 
MAV being four to five times that of AD+1 MAV. We consider AD+1 MAV to be an 
effect of the number of investors who are interested in profiting on the change, as risk 
arbitrageurs take a position to grab as much of the gain as possible. We use the change in 
this volume over time (Figure 5 and 6) as our second proxy for investor interest, and 
found it to be significantly correlated to our first proxy, CO-MAR (Figure 7). Admittedly 
though, just because the two proxies are correlated this does not mean that either is 
strongly correlated to investor interest. 
Although relatively heavy, the volume on A+1 is dwarfed by that of the change 
day. This is the day that index managers will typically add or remove a company from 
their fund to most closely track the index. We use the change in CD volume (CD-MAV) 
over time (Figure 5 and 6) as our first proxy for the increase in indexing over the period. 
Figure 5 and 6 also show the increase in both AD+1 and CD volume over time, this is the 
data used as proxy for investor interest and indexing respectively. In addition, we have 
displayed the average volumes of the days between AD+1 and CD over time. You can 
see here that although the volume on these intervening days has also increased, the slope 
of the increase is much less than that of CD volume. This is further indication that index 
fund managers are waiting until the change day to update their portfolio, choosing a 
minimal tracking error over any possible price appreciation. 
 
Other Proxies 
 In an attempt to develop a second proxy for indexing over time, we obtained the 
net asset value (NAV) of the Vanguard 500 and the S&P 500 from 1990 to 1999. The 
Vanguard 500 is one of the largest and most widely held mutual funds in America, and 
has been both a driver for and a result of the trend toward indexing as a savings vehicle. 
From 1990 to the end of 1998, the Vanguard 500 went from being a $1.7B fund to nearly 
$80B, and went as high as $110B in 2000. By contrast, the NAV of the S&P 500 
increased from $2300B to $9300B in the same period. As a percentage (Figure 8), the 
Vanguard 500’s ownership of the index rose nearly 11 times from 1990 to 1999. 
 Figures 7 shows the relationship between the two indexing proxies and the two 
investor interest proxies, while the third graph of Figure 8 actually shows the high 
correlation between our investor interest and indexing proxies. In the graphs we can see 
the few outliers caused by greater than normal volume on either the change or addition 
day. The relationships found between the variables used as proxies are positive and 
statistically significant although, again, this does not mean that they are actually 
correlated to indexing or investor interest. 
 
Regressions 
 With the four proxies that we developed, two for indexing and two for investor 
interest, we attempted to determine a significant relationship between indexing, investor 
interest, and the change in AD+1 open to CD close abnormal return over time (OC-
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MAR). Although not successful in presenting a clear relationship between investor 
interest, indexing, and trading profits (OC-MAR), we present our results here as an aid to 
future work on our part or others’. In three cases for additions and three cases for 
deletions we show the linear and quadratic regressions of an indexing and investor 
interest proxy against OC-MAR. Although we had hoped that combining the additions 
and deletions into one sample (with a switched sign for the deletion OC-MAR) would aid 
in finding significance, it did not help so we do not present those results here. 
 We would expect that OC-MAR would decrease as investor interest represented 
by either overnight return (CO-MAR) or A+1 volume (A+1 MAV) increased. This was 
consistently demonstrated in our regressions, occasionally to a statistically significant 
level. We would also expect that as indexing represented by close day volume (CD-
MAV) or Vanguard 500 NAV as a fraction of the S&P 500 NAV (IFM) increased that 
the trading profits available would also increase. However, this relationship was 
demonstrated in only one set of regressions, and not to a statistically significant level. We 
believe that the huge increases in investor interest in the last ten years have so affected 
OC-MAR that it overpowers the effect of increased indexing. Here we will show the 
most successful regression, as well as two other combinations that are interesting. 
 As an aside, we would like to point out that although some graphs labeled 
quadratic may look linear (Figures 11, 13, 15, and 19), they are quadratic and do have a 
slightly changing slope over the range. The impression of linearity is a result of the very 
small coefficients related to the squared term of the indexing proxy term. 
 
 OC-MAR vs. C-MAV and A+1 MAV. Figure 9 shows our most successful attempt 
at regressing a proxy for indexing against trading profits. We can see that in this case, the 
investor interest (A+1 MAV) relationship to OC-MAR is the usual concave shape in the 
quadratic and has a negative slope in the linear. However, in this instance the indexing 
(C-MAV) variable relationship shows a portion on the quadratic graph where the 
relationship of indexing to profits is positive. Although it returns to the usual negative in 
the purely linear regression (Figure 10), we were able to find some success in regressing 
the quadratic relationship shown below. 
 
OC-MAR = 0.0765 - 0.0197 A+1 MAV + 0.00124 A+1 MAV^2 +0.000510 C MAV 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant      0.07650     0.01476       5.18    0.000 
A+1 MAV     -0.019703    0.007583      -2.60    0.012 
A+1 MAV^    0.0012423   0.0005119       2.43    0.019 
C MAV       0.0005099   0.0009142       0.56    0.580 
 
 This indicates to us the possibility of a non-linear relationship between investor 
interest and trading profits (significant), and a weakly linear relationship between 
indexing and trading profits (not significant). 
 
 OC-MAR vs. C-MAV and CO-MAR, and OC-MAR vs. IFM and CO-MAR. In 
Figures 11-20 we can see an example of the investor interest variable completely 
overpowering the indexing proxy. Although the linear regression shows the downward 
sloping investor interest correlation very well, it also shows how the trading return is 
negatively related to the amount of indexing going on. Because we cannot find any 
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reasonable explanation for this we believe that it a result of the increase in investor 
interest over the same time period of the increase in indexing. Because the investor 
interest variable increased so much, our indexing variable is overwhelmed in the 
regression, especially with the low volume of data that we have to work with. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 This article analyses price and volume data for firms added to or deleted from the 
S&P 500 from October 1989 through December 1999. Because of the time difference 
between the announcement and the actual change in the index, we have an opportunity to 
observe the market react to significant demand changing information. 
 For both additions and deletions the data reveals a distinct pattern of price and 
volume movements. For additions we find that the stock exhibits significant increases 
from the announcement through the change day, and then a decline from the change day 
through the release-ending period when the price steadied approximately 8% above its 
pre-announcement price. The effect on deletions is more extreme, as the stock generally 
settles about 14% below its pre-announcement price. There is also a difference in that 
deletions do not exhibit a sustained price increase after the change day, instead showing a 
slight increase as selling pressure abates before resuming the decline. 
 The information that we have developed for both the overnight change after 
announcement and the change available as trading profits from the open after 
announcement to the close on the change day is statistically significant for both additions 
and deletions. Although our longer term addition data is not statistically significant, the 
data for deletions indicates a permanent price change which can only be explained by the 
downward sloping demand hypothesis, and adds to the body of work that has pointed out 
a downward slope in the demand curve for securities. The information and liquidity 
effects discussed earlier can explain the initial overnight change, and the price pressure 
hypothesis can explain the increase in price on the change day. However, only the 
downward sloping demand curve can explain a permanent increase (decrease) in the price 
of securities that are added to (deleted from) the S&P 500. 
 For volumes, we continue to see the heavy spikes in market-adjusted volume on 
the day after the announcement and the day of the change. This indicates that although 
there is a demonstrated increased return for investors that buy earlier, most index fund 
managers still chose to track the index as closely as possible, minimizing the possible 
tracking error. We also find evidence of increased steady state trading volumes after the 
change for both additions and deletions. This is consistent with studies by Lynch and 
Mendenhall, and could be a permanent or slowly waning effect of each stock’s renewed 
publicity. We leave it to future studies to determine if daily volumes decline back to 
historical levels or remain elevated for an extended period. 
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this study is the evidence of an 
increase in market efficiency over time. We have taken the overnight return after 
announcement (CO-MAR) as a proxy for investor interest, and found that this proxy has 
increased significantly over time, thus lowering the possible trading profit available to 
risk arbitrageurs. We believe that this is the first study that has shown such a relationship, 
although future work should focus on evaluating the actual relationship between available 
abnormal returns, investor interest in this trade, and indexing based on the S&P 500. 
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Figure 1. Average Return From Event Days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Although Table 1 and 2 show the opening prices for the AD+1 and CD+1, they are not displayed 
here.
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Figure 2.  Average Volume from Event Days 
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Figure 3. Additions: Returns By Date 
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Table 1. Additions: Above Market Returns  
 
 
Event Day N MAR tc(MAR) %N>0 
A. AD = 0: 
-9 112       0.24% 1.01           48% 
-8 112       -0.12% (0.52)          44% 
-7 112       -0.06% (0.21)          46% 
-6 112       -0.43% (0.79)          41% 
-5 112       0.13% 0.54           50% 
-4 112       0.59% 2.48           58% 
-3 112       0.29% 1.24           52% 
-2 112       0.07% 0.24           54% 
-1 112       0.04% 0.16           44% 
0 112       0.01% 0.03           48% 
*1 112       4.79% 15.78          39% 
**1 112       -0.46% (1.73)          94% 
***1 112       4.34% 13.16          93% 
2 103       0.54% 1.82           54% 
3 85        1.05% 3.19           65% 
4 64        0.89% 2.62           61% 
5 29        0.62% 1.15           66% 
6:10 25        0.84% 1.87           64% 
B. CD = 0: 
-10:-6 25        100.00% #DIV/0! 100% 
-5 29        0.69% 0.96           59% 
-4 64        2.29% 5.11           78% 
-3 85        2.22% 6.07           69% 
-2 103       1.30% 4.24           65% 
-1 112       1.83% 5.24           71% 
0 112       2.36% 5.08           71% 
1 112       -1.32% (2.49)          34% 
2 112       -0.58% (2.03)          45% 
3 112       0.81% 0.80           46% 
4 112       -0.95% (1.86)          40% 
5 112       0.25% 1.06           46% 
6 112       -0.68% (1.61)          47% 
****7 112       0.04% 0.14           48% 
8 112       -0.54% (2.00)          41% 
9 112       -0.12% (0.42)          43% 
10 112       -0.16% (0.64)          0% 
A+1 Open to CD Close 112       5.45% 5.74           75% 
AD+1 Open to Release 
End 
112       3.12% 0.02           62% 
* This is the Percent Change Overnight. It cannot be captured by traders. 
** 
*** This is the total of the above two, the Close to Close return.
**** This is the release ending day (Lynch and Mendenhall 1997).
This is the Percent Change during the day. Th is is the trading profit of the first day from the Open Price. 
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Figure 4. Deletions: Returns By Date 
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Table 2. Deletions: Above Market Returns  
 
 
 
Event Day N Actual Above-Market Return tc(MAV) %N<0
A. AD=0:
-9 52       0.54% 1.21       38%
-8 52       -0.76% (1.86)      44%
-7 52       -0.75% (1.98)      38%
-6 52       0.56% 0.84       33%
-5 52       -0.09% (0.22)      31%
-4 52       1.45% 1.94       31%
-3 52       -0.24% (0.62)      44%
-2 52       0.25% 0.63       37%
-1 52       -0.82% (2.41)      33%
0 52       0.20% 0.37       37%
*1 52       -3.26% (3.65)      71%
**1 52       -3.25% (3.32)      71%
***1 52       -6.51% (10.20)     62%
2 47       -1.10% (3.00)      36%
3 46       -0.44% (1.11)      41%
4 43       -2.01% (4.17)      42%
5 26       0.26% 0.46       12%
6:10 23       -1.44% (3.02)      22%
B. CD=O:
-10:-6 23       100.00% NA NA
-5 26       -2.27% (5.54)      27%
-4 43       -4.22% (8.45)      49%
-3 46       -1.14% (2.98)      37%
-2 47       -1.02% (2.35)      40%
-1 52       -3.12% (4.25)      48%
0 52       -4.94% (5.69)      52%
1 52       1.76% 1.51       12%
2 52       -2.98% (1.50)      40%
3 51       -0.17% (0.22)      25%
4 51       0.55% 1.18       37%
****5 51       0.87% 2.73       16%
6 51       0.85% 1.67       29%
7 51       -0.17% (0.32)      39%
8 51       -0.93% (2.17)      37%
9 51       -1.18% (4.13)      49%
10 51       -0.63% (1.61)      0%
A+1 Open to CD Close 51       -10.15% (6.80)      70%
AD+1 Open to Release End 51       -10.13% (2.43)      77%
* This is the Percent Change Overnight. It cannot be captured by traders.
**
*** This is the total of the above two, the Close to Close return.
*** This is the release ending day (Lynch and Mendenhall 1997).
This is the Percent Change during the day. This is the trading profit of the first day from the Open Price.
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Figure 5. Additions: Average Volumes between A+1 and Close 
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Table 3. Additions: Market Adjusted Volume 
 
 
 
Event Day N MAV tc(MAV) %N>0
A. AD = 0:
-9 112   4.93% 0.76      40%
-8 112   -10.06% (2.86)     38%
-7 112   -3.15% (0.73)     38%
-6 112   -3.84% (0.76)     38%
-5 112   -2.46% (0.55)     41%
-4 112   1.88% 0.42      44%
-3 112   -3.05% (0.71)     39%
-2 112   6.72% 1.15      42%
-1 112   -1.18% (0.25)     37%
0 112   10.21% 1.90      52%
1 112   325.27% 9.56      96%
2 103   137.18% 7.98      90%
3 85    120.62% 6.55      80%
4 64    96.61% 5.66      77%
5 29    59.95% 2.68      59%
6:10 25    42.06% 2.25      60%
B. CD = 0:
-6 112   16.10% 2.12      41%
-5 112   27.01% 3.09      52%
-4 112   101.94% 6.19      68%
-3 112   127.01% 7.59      78%
-2 112   136.99% 7.53      82%
-1 112   239.45% 8.09      90%
0 112   1445.83% 12.42     99%
1 112   256.47% 10.24     93%
2 112   117.35% 8.89      83%
3 112   99.38% 7.64      79%
4 112   82.51% 7.46      74%
5 112   52.74% 6.69      68%
6 112   61.10% 5.78      72%
7 112   46.09% 3.57      63%
8 112   43.60% 4.42      56%
9 112   46.07% 5.37      66%
10 112   48.67% 4.04      61%
Market Adjusted Volume Changes 
(as % of pre-announcement 10 day average)
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Figure 6. Deletions: Average Volumes between A+1 and Close 
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Table 4. Deletions : Market Adjusted Volume 
 
 
 
 
Event Day N Market Adjusted Volume % tc(MAV) %N>0
A. AD=0:
-9 52     3.36% 0.53     37%
-8 52     13.55% 1.96     37%
-7 52     -5.72% (1.05)    27%
-6 52     9.78% 1.37     37%
-5 52     -0.55% (0.11)    21%
-4 52     -3.69% (0.70)    29%
-3 52     -2.44% (0.35)    25%
-2 52     -0.91% (0.18)    31%
-1 52     -13.38% (3.07)    15%
0 52     0.00% 0.00     35%
1 52     308.11% 3.08     58%
2 47     140.14% 2.83     49%
3 46     144.00% 2.39     46%
4 43     100.18% 3.08     42%
5 26     20.64% 1.56     19%
6 23     18.61% 1.82     22%
B. CD=O:
-6 52     7.57% 0.88     35%
-5 52     2.95% 0.41     27%
-4 52     98.71% 3.12     52%
-3 52     83.80% 3.16     42%
-2 52     162.94% 3.15     46%
-1 52     309.60% 2.90     54%
0 52     1720.13% 4.28     60%
1 52     396.52% 3.86     56%
2 52     148.36% 3.20     46%
3 52     118.16% 3.10     44%
4 52     129.65% 2.99     42%
5 52     111.48% 3.69     44%
6 52     67.50% 3.03     44%
7 52     48.13% 2.90     38%
8 52     64.94% 2.73     48%
9 52     80.56% 3.31     42%
10 52     49.07% 2.46     35%
Market Adjusted Volume Changes
 (as % of pre-announcement 10 day average)
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 Figure 7. Proxies for Investor Interest and Indexing. 
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Figure 8. Proxies over Time and Correlation of Investor Interest and Indexing. 
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Figure 9. Additions 
OC-MAR = 0.0593 - 0.0276 A+1 MAV + 0.00175 A+1 MAV^2 + 0.00432 C MAV-0.000069 C-MAV^2 
 Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant      0.05933     0.01896       3.13    0.003 
A+1 MAV     -0.027557    0.009322      -2.96    0.005 
A+1 MAV^    0.0017531   0.0006213       2.82    0.007 
C MAV        0.004318    0.002829       1.53    0.134 
C-MAV^2   -0.00006916  0.00004868      -1.42    0.162 
 
S = 0.05000     R-Sq = 17.3%     R-Sq(adj) = 10.4% 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Additions OC-MAR = 0.0553 - 0.00273 A+1 MAV -0.000171 C MAV 
  
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant      0.05530     0.01247       4.43    0.000 
A+1 MAV     -0.002734    0.003076      -0.89    0.378 
C MAV      -0.0001714   0.0009116      -0.19    0.852 
 
S = 0.05293     R-Sq = 3.5%      
Investor Interest:OC-MAR as Quadratic Fxn of A+1 MAV. 
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Figure 11. Additions 
OC-MAR= 0.0763-0.0062*C MAV+ 0.000006*C MAV^2 - 1.21*CO-MAR + 9.68*CO-MAR^2 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant      0.07631     0.02122       3.60    0.001 
C MAV       -0.000618    0.002117      -0.29    0.772 
C-MAV^2    0.00000574  0.00004064       0.14    0.888 
CO-MAR        -1.2121      0.5190      -2.34    0.024 
CO-MAR^2        9.680       4.506       2.15    0.037 
 
S = 0.05151     R-Sq = 12.3%  
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Additions OC-MAR= 0.0618-0.000541*C MAV- 0.211*CO-MAR 
  
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant      0.06178     0.01508       4.10    0.000 
C MAV      -0.0005411   0.0007117      -0.76    0.451 
CO-MAR        -0.2108      0.2265      -0.93    0.356 
 
S = 0.05289     R-Sq = 3.6%   
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Figure 13. Additions  
OC-MAR= 0.0836 - 4.5 IFM+77IFM^2-1.25 CO-MAR+10.8 CO-MAR^2 
 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant      0.08359     0.02764       3.02    0.004 
IFM             -4.53       16.04      -0.28    0.779 
IFM^2              77        1797       0.04    0.966 
CO-MAR        -1.2503      0.5454      -2.29    0.026 
CO-MAR^2       10.834       4.948       2.19    0.033 
 
S = 0.05101     R-Sq = 13.9% 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Additions OC-MAR= 0.0620 - 2.27 IFM - 0.188 CO-MAR 
 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant      0.06198     0.01612       3.84    0.000 
IFM            -2.274       3.602      -0.63    0.531 
CO-MAR        -0.1883      0.2423      -0.78    0.441 
 
S = 0.05298     R-Sq = 3.3% 
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Figures 15. Deletions  
  OC-MAR = - 0.170+0.0102 A+1 MAV -0.000193 A+1 MAV^2 + 0.00150 C MAV-
0.000007 C-MAV^2 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant     -0.16955     0.02666      -6.36    0.000 
A+1 MAV      0.010198    0.008487       1.20    0.246 
A+1 MAV^   -0.0001932   0.0001478      -1.31    0.208 
C MAV        0.001502    0.002363       0.64    0.534 
C-MAV^2   -0.00000677  0.00001279      -0.53    0.603 
 
S = 0.07988     R-Sq = 36.8% 
 
 
 
 
  Figures 16. Deletions OC-MAR = - 0.140 + 0.00218 A+1 MAV +0.000627 C MAV 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant     -0.13993     0.02145      -6.52    0.000 
A+1 MAV      0.002183    0.001939       1.13    0.274 
C MAV       0.0006274   0.0005212       1.20    0.243 
 
S = 0.08265     R-Sq = 20.7% 
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Figure 17. Deletions  
OC-MAR= - 0.159 - 0.968*CO-MAR-2.88*CO-MAR^2+0.00208*C-MAV-0.000011*C-MAV^2 
  
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant     -0.15879     0.02493      -6.37    0.000 
CO-MAR        -0.9680      0.6237      -1.55    0.139 
CO-MAR^2       -2.878       5.772      -0.50    0.624 
C MAV        0.002077    0.001435       1.45    0.166 
C-MAV^2   -0.00001062  0.00000830      -1.28    0.218 
 
S = 0.07673     R-Sq = 41.7%  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure18. Deletions OC-MAR=-0.142-0.942*CO-MAR + 0.000340*C-MAV 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant     -0.14204     0.01906      -7.45    0.000 
CO-MAR        -0.9424      0.3742      -2.52    0.020 
C MAV       0.0003400   0.0004689       0.73    0.477 
 
S = 0.07426     R-Sq = 36.0%  
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Figure 19. Deletions  
OC-MAR= - 0.357 + 0.0647 IFM - 0.00389 IFM^2 - 1.12 CO-MAR + 0.19 CO-MAR^2 
  
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant     -0.35740     0.09949      -3.59    0.002 
IFM           0.06467     0.03583       1.80    0.088 
IFM^2       -0.003887    0.002768      -1.40    0.177 
CO-MAR        -1.1175      0.4921      -2.27    0.036 
CO-MAR^2        0.186       4.755       0.04    0.969 
 
S = 0.06249     R-Sq = 59.2% 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Deletions OC-MAR= - 0.224 + 0.0146 IFM - 1.10 CO-MAR 
  
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant     -0.22405     0.03276      -6.84    0.000 
IFM          0.014638    0.004891       2.99    0.007 
CO-MAR        -1.1014      0.2762      -3.99    0.001 
 
S = 0.06252     R-Sq = 54.6%. 
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